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Abstract—Security and usability issues with passwords suggest
a need for a new authentication scheme. Several alternatives
involve a physical device or token. We investigate one such
alternative, Pico: an authentication scheme that utilizes multiple
wearable devices. We present the grounded theory results of a
series of semi-structured interviews for exploring perceptions
of this scheme. We found that the idea of carrying physical
devices increases perceived personal responsibility for secure
authentication, making the risks and inconvenience associated
with loss and theft salient for participants. Although our work is
focused on Pico, the results of the study contribute to a broader
understanding of user perception and concerns of responsibility
for any token-based authentication schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most users gain access to services using text-based pass-
words. This is despite wide recognition that passwords are
impractical from a usability standpoint and vulnerable to
attack from a security standpoint. Research by Adams and
Sasse [1], Beautement et al. [4], and Weirich and Sasse [31]
suggests that users hold inaccurate notions of security and
its importance, and are thus less likely to adhere strictly to
security policies. Users also often struggle to use different
passwords for different accounts, each sufficiently long with a
combination of letters, numbers, and symbols [26].
Even strong passwords are routinely compromised through
malware and phishing attacks. Thus, rather than longer and
more complex passwords, we require a stronger authentication
scheme. We evaluate an alternative and more secure token-
based system designed to eliminate passwords: Pico [26]. It
has two key elements. First, the user scans a QR code that
appears in a browser for web authentication with a small,
portable, dedicated authentication token called Pico. This
token should have a display, button, and camera for taking
a picture of the QR code. Second, the Pico is protected from
the consequences of loss or theft by smaller, wearable devices
called Picosiblings; the Pico automatically locks when not in
close proximity to K out of N of these devices.
It is difficult to encourage users and service providers to
consider adopting Pico because we are not only challenging
passwords as they are supposed to be used, but as they are
actually used, which is more usable, though less secure, than
Pico. The first task is to identify initial reactions to a new
scheme such as Pico, before dealing with long-term use.
Our research aims to explore the acceptable design space of
Pico prior to implementation, using low-fidelity prototypes to
provoke discussion about its perceived usability and security.
To do this, we examined data from semi-structured in-
terviews using grounded theory (GT), first developed by so-
ciologists Glaser and Strauss [14] and developed further by
Strauss and Corbin [28]. We used GT because it allows for
systematic and empirical theory-creation [12] [23], making it
suited to exploratory research such as this. GT does not extend
or test an existing theory; it is used to formulate a theory based
inductively on participant concerns and how they try to resolve
them. Thus, despite the use of prototypes, the aim was not to
involve participants in the design of tokens, but to gain insights
into their opinions and concerns about a token-based system
such as Pico.
In adopting this methodology, our research makes three
contributions. First, while GT has already been adopted in
examining password practices by such researchers as Adams et
al. [1] [2] and Stobert and Biddle [27], we extend this to token-
based authentication; in doing so, we contribute to the field
by providing insight into factors influencing the acceptability
of token-based schemes. Second, we not only reveal what
opinions emerge, but why they emerge. Finally, we present
a final GT model that systematically analyzes participant
perceptions of Pico in terms of personal responsibility and
the tangibility of security using tokens. To our knowledge, the
issue of personal responsibility has not been formally identified
in literature with regards to security tokens.
II. BACKGROUND
The number of passwords users are asked to create and
maintain pushes beyond what people can reasonably be ex-
pected to remember [1], especially given the inconsistency
between password policies [13] [24]. As research by Adams
et al. [1] [2], Shay et al. [25], and Stobert and Biddle [27]
indicates, users rely on coping strategies, such as reusing and
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storing passwords. Even passwords created within password
policy guidelines can be easy to crack using dictionary and
brute-force attacks because users fulfill requirements in pre-
dictable ways [7] [25]. To tackle these limitations, alternative
types of passwords have been proposed.
A passphrase – a sequence of words – is typically longer,
harder to guess, and easier to remember than a traditional
password [19] [25]. However, Shay et al. [25] found that
assigned passphrases did not outperform assigned passwords
on usability, and users tended to write them down. Addition-
ally, Keith et al. [19] found that user-generated passphrases
and passwords resulted in similar levels of recall failure, and
that passphrases induced more typographical errors and were
perceived as being harder to use than passwords. Additionally,
similar to traditional passwords, passphrases are harder to keep
track of and remember as the number of accounts increases,
assuming the user tries to create different passphrases for
different accounts.
Some argue that graphical passwords are easier to manage
and to keep secure than text-based passwords. The argument is
that pictures are remembered better and for longer than words,
making graphical passwords more manageable than text-based
passwords [10] [5]. However, visual memory capacities may
be over-estimated and, like text-based passwords, graphical
passwords are often highly predictable [10], as well as less
accessible for the visually impaired [5].
Instead of passphrases and graphical passwords, perhaps all
that is needed is a usable method of storing unique and secure
alphanumeric passwords, such as a portable password manager.
This has drawbacks, including requiring the user to transcribe
text and to carry an extra device. Phone-based password
managers might be more convenient to carry, and, according to
Karole et al. [18], also increase trust because a phone is locally
controlled by the user. However, it still involves transcribing
passwords into the terminal. USB password managers are
directly inserted into the terminal, but a USB drive is still an
extra device to carry, and not every device (such as a tablet)
has an available USB port. Although more usable, users in
Karole et al.’s [18] study did not like the idea of using an
online password manager because it requires trust in a third-
party service provider that stores encrypted passwords on a
remote server.
Recently, FIDO (Fast IDentity Online), an open industry
alliance of vendors, including Microsoft, PayPal, and Visa,
released two sets of specifications for online authentication:
UAF (Universal Authentication Framework) and U2F (Uni-
versal Second Factor). Both involve authenticating to online
services with a device. UAF replaces passwords entirely by
allowing users to authenticate from a FIDO-enabled device,
such as a smartphone. It involves registering the user’s device
to online services and selecting a biometric authentication
action, such as swiping a finger, performed on the device. U2F
replaces the second factor in two-factor authentication (2FA)
with a dongle that the user inserts into a USB port. The user
presses a button on that dongle to authenticate to services after
typing a password.
Users tend not to like 2FA when it involves carrying a
dedicated device. De Cristofaro et al. [11] found that dedicated
tokens were the least used method of 2FA: almost 90% of
participants used email or SMS; approximately 45% used a
phone app; less than a quarter used tokens. Most used a
hardware token only because their employer or bank forced
them to. This is in line with Krol et al. [21], who found that
carrying and operating a hardware token for 2FA with online
banking negatively correlated with satisfaction.
There is little research into user experiences and percep-
tions of entirely token-based authentication, despite there being
a number of potential benefits over passwords. Most notably,
these are security benefits: physical tokens tend to be resilient
to physical observation and guessing [5]. They also alleviate
memory issues associated with having to remember passwords
and linking the right ones to the right accounts. There are,
however, important drawbacks. Tokens require users to carry
an additional item – a usability issue [5]. There is also the
potential for loss and theft. This is both an inconvenience (in
terms of token-recovery) and a security challenge [5] [18]:
if physical tokens are not always something that users really
“have”, then unauthorized persons could access services that
belong to someone else. Picosiblings offer a potential solution
to this, but also present a notable usability drawback: users
are asked to carry multiple devices to safeguard them against
loss and theft. Is there scope to create a usable authentication
scheme that relies on multiple physical devices?
III. THE STUDY
Our study was conducted to develop a theory that ex-
plains the acceptability of token-based authentication. This
was defined within the design space of Pico, aided by, but
not limited to, the low-fidelity prototypes described in the
following section. In particular, we are interested in how Pico
is understood and how any concerns are resolved in the minds
of participants, as this will give us insight into their mental
models of token usability and security, informing the final GT.
A. Method
Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted, lasting
between fifteen and thirty-five minutes depending on how
much the participant wanted to communicate. The interview
involved two preference tasks, asking participants to identify
which items they might be willing to carry: for Pico itself and
for the Picosiblings that unlock it. Each task was followed by
questions about the items chosen. The participant’s main points
were iterated back to them; the interviewer asked if these were
correct and if the participant had anything to add.
The data were examined using GT, characterized by con-
stant comparison of data to identify themes and categories that
would otherwise be overlooked [12]. The theory is sufficiently
developed when no new categories emerge during this compar-
ative process – theoretical saturation [14] [6]. GT occurs over
three overlapping phases. Adhering to Strauss and Corbin’s
[28] conception of coding, these stages include:
1) Open coding. Dividing data into segments and look-
ing for commonalities that reflect categories. The aim
is to reduce the data into a smaller set of themes that
appear to describe the topic under investigation;
2) Axial (focused) coding. Grouping discrete codes into
conceptual categories that reflect commonalities and
describe relationships between codes;
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3) Selective coding. Identifying the process by which
categories relate to a core category by selectively
analyzing code clusters to form the GT.
A number of procedures helped ensure the credibility of the
analysis. First, notes taken during interviews were compared
with corresponding video-recordings. This reduced interviewer
bias, helped the researchers acquire a deep understanding
of the core concepts, and ensured the veracity of the data.
Second, we began with trial open-coding of the first six inter-
views. A consistency check was conducted where the primary
researcher coded the interviews on two separate occasions
(double-coding) and drafted an initial coding frame. A second
coder (“peer debriefer”) identified key themes without this
coding frame (blind-coding)1. Coding proper restarted from
interviews one to sixteen. The primary researcher and peer
debriefer made separate memos and came together to discuss
the developing coding frame. Third, axial coding was expanded
to include data from an additional four interviews, helping us
determine whether the emerging theory adequately described
the data and that theoretical saturation was reached. Fourth,
the researchers consistently referred back to transcriptions,
checking throughout the coding process that categories did
emerge from the data. Finally, the primary researcher and
peer debriefer sought diverse feedback on interpretations of the
data and evolving theory from two “inquiry auditors”: another
research team member and a colleague at a different university.
B. Prototypes
Two Pico designs and thirty-six Picosibling prototypes
were created for the preference tasks conducted during the
interviews, making the idea of carrying devices more tangible
and easier to discuss. These prototypes are described below.
1) Pico: Two prototypes were designed to be as com-
parable as possible in functions and features: same sized
screen with green overlay for aiming at the QR code; LED
strip and list of options; selection button; means of scrolling;
and camera. These prototypes were drawn, then recreated in
plasticine and Polymorph2. Polymorph versions were used in
the interviews (Figure 1).
The main differences between these prototypes were in
overall shape and scrolling function. The first Pico prototype
was similar to a credit-card but 3mm thick to (theoretically)
allow for a camera and screen in the hardware. This prototype
included arrows for scrolling between accounts. The second
prototype was cylindrical, roughly the length of the card-
shaped prototype, with a scroll bar wrapped around one end.
They could be easily re-oriented to suit participant handedness.
2) Picosiblings: There were thirty-six Picosibling items,
such as glasses and watches, magnetic clips, small free-
standing coin-shaped discs, and items to which some coin-
shaped discs were attached, such as keys and hairbands. Most
items were plain, made from black plastic, and shaped by a
laser cutter for uniformity in design (Figure 2). Others were
created or bought based on pilot participants’ suggestions for
items such as an ID card.
1There is typically no numerical inter-rater reliability reported with GT
because codes are transitory and dynamic.
2Small plastic granules that, when heated in hot water, form a transparent
flexible material; this hardens again as it cools.
Fig. 1. Left: prototypes, drawn then modeled in plasticine. Right: prototypes
modeled using Polymorph, used in the interviews.
Fig. 2. Picosiblings used in interviews.
C. Procedure
Before beginning, participants gave informed written con-
sent to partake in the study, which included having their
hands video-recorded (Figure 3), alongside their comments, as
they interacted with the prototypes. Participants then answered
short demographic questions and, at their own pace, navigated
through a set of presentation slides introducing Pico and how it
would work for logging into web accounts (typically less than
2 minutes). This avoided variability in the description of Pico.
A video-recorder was then turned on and the semi-structured
interview began.
Interviews consisted of nine core questions, each with can-
didate follow-up questions designed to encourage participants
to give more information, such as “why do you think that is?”
Fig. 3. Left: A participant comparing the two Pico prototypes; Right: A
participant interacting with the Picosiblings.
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and “can you tell me more about...”. Though the core questions
followed on logically from each other, it was not necessary
to ask the core questions strictly in that order: as is the
nature of semi-structured interviews, if the participant took the
discussion down a different route, the researcher could chose
to ask a core question earlier or later than planned, so long
as all core questions were eventually covered. Nevertheless,
most interviews followed the structure listed below, and the
first question was always the same3:
• How participants found using and remembering pass-
words
• Which of the two Pico prototypes they preferred
• Whether carrying a standalone Pico was something the
participant could imagine doing
• The kinds of items they already carried with them
• Why they chose particular Picosiblings
• Whether there were other items they might have as
Picosiblings
• The number of Picosiblings they would be willing to
carry with them at one time
• Any problems they envisaged with the system
• Whether they had any suggestions for the design of
our token-based scheme.
Videos were checked against notes taken in each interview.
The recordings were watched and listened to several times by
more than one researcher, and were transcribed and coded to
extract phenomena (events, objects, actions, ideas, issues, and
experiences) of relevance to the potential use and design of
our scheme. According to Glaser [15], and other researchers
(e.g. [20] [16]), there is no need to transcribe interviews in
their entirety. Instead, a mixed-method of transcribing and
analysis was employed – “selective transcription”, where unre-
lated rapport-building conversation and interviewer questions
themselves were not included [16].
D. Participants
Participants were sampled from a population of people
who use passwords to access online accounts, recruited using
online advertisements and snowball sampling. To maximize the
potential to discover as many concepts as possible, GT is often
conducted using a highly variable sample [28] [6]. For this
reason, in later stages of data collection and analysis, represen-
tative individuals were selected from particular sub-groups for
their theoretical relevance – their potential for introducing new
data for developing categories. This is theoretical sampling,
described by Glaser and Strauss [14], and Strauss and Corbin
[28]. Specifically, the aim was to maximize diversity in age
(20-57), gender (10 male, 10 female), and occupation (Ta-
ble I)4. In total, twenty participants were recruited; mean age
was 30.5 years (29.2 for male participants; 31.8 for female).
An Amazon voucher was offered to participants to thank them.
3This preliminary question eased participants into the interview and into
thinking about authentication.
4Participant gender is included in Table I to give readers an idea of the
variability of participants even when more than one had the same occupation.
Participant ages are omitted to avoid participants being personally identifiable
based on the aggregation of this information.
TABLE I. PARTICIPANT COUNTS BY OCCUPATION
Participant Occupation (and gender) Count
Accounting (female) 1
Engineering (male) 1
Military (male) 1
Admin/Clerical (male) 1
Publishing (female) 1
Translating (female) 1
Software Developer (male) 1
Homemaker (female) 1
Unemployed Software Engineer (male) 1
Unemployed Product Designer (female) 1
Researcher: Physics (male) 1
Researcher: Neuronal Development (male) 1
Researcher: Cancer (female) 1
School Teaching Assistant (1 male, 1 female) 2
Postgrad Student: Sustainable Energy (female) 1
Postgrad Student: Comp Sci (1 male, 1 female) 2
Student: undisclosed subject (male) 1
No occupation given (female) 1
IV. RESULTS
Open coding of the first six interviews (trial phase) involved
selecting and labeling words and phrases to form codes and
initial categories. The two coders were in agreement about the
main categories and conducted open coding again, this time
on interviews one to sixteen. Here we report the coding frame
created during axial coding. Data collected from the final four
interviews substantiated the core categories for the Pico Token,
and Picosiblings, described here.
A. Pico Token
Responses related to the Pico token fell into three core
categories: Convenience of logging into services, Prototype
Preferences for a dedicated Pico, and Trustworthiness in terms
of reliability and security.
1) Convenience: The main issues associated with the con-
venience of using Pico were: (i) the Efficiency of authenti-
cation; (ii) Deployment, or the number and types of services
and devices that could be used with Pico; and (iii) Pico as
Something to Carry.
i. Efficiency: It was important that logging in with Pico
would be low-effort and time-effective. In particular, partici-
pants expressed concern over the number of steps involved,
dictated in part by having to interact directly with the Pico,
which was perceived as awkward and unnecessary. Participant
19, for example, stated:
“It should be very, very simple for people to use.
And I didn’t at all see the point of having to select
things on [Pico]... I want to, like, maybe authorize
and cancel.”
ii. Deployment: The acceptability of Pico was dependent
on it being widely adopted. It was considered important that
users could authenticate to most, if not all, services and devices
before it was worth the effort of carrying and using Pico,
captured in the following comment from Participant 5:
“In terms of investing in a piece of technology, it
would need to be able to connect to everything that
I use before I think it would be worthwhile investing
in it”
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Some suggested that they would use Pico only if they were
forced to (e.g. for work) or because it was the only authenti-
cation method available.
One of the main issues was that participants did not
see the relevance of Pico for mobile devices, since these
typically provide users access to a number of services without
requiring them to repeatedly login. This challenge for token-
based authentication is summarized in the following comment
from Participant 12:
“Most people these days are always on the move,
and always logging in from things like their tablets
or their phones... I can’t see a real need to, like, bring
[Pico]”
iii. Something to Carry: The majority expressed a prefer-
ence for a Pico that was integrated with some other device
that they already carried. There were two main categories
of suggestion: design Pico with a Dual-Purpose, or create a
Smartphone App. Participants gave a number of suggestions
for a Pico that was designed to be part of some other useful
device, such as a watch or a debit/credit card, and to therefore
serve some additional function other than authentication. For
example, Participant 8 stated:
“I could see that it would be more use if it was built
into something else... that you have to carry around
with you anyway that just does something extra”
The most popular suggestion, however, was that Pico be
integrated with their phone.
2) Prototype Preferences: While the majority of partici-
pants would prefer to carry a dual-purpose Pico or smartphone
app, some described the idea of carrying a separate dedicated
Pico to be not too much of a burden. The extent to which
participants were comfortable with carrying a dedicated Pico
was dependent on: (i) Familiarity and (ii) whether it would be
Easy to Use, Hold, and Carry.
i. Familiarity: User experience of other devices had an
impact on their acceptance of a dedicated Pico, specifically:
Familiarity of Concept and Familiarity of Design. Familiarity
of concept refers to prior experience of carrying some form
of security token, such as bank tokens. Familiarity of design
refers to experience with physically similar devices. Generally,
participants preferred the more familiar, card-shaped design to
the more novel, cylindrical design because the card-shaped
design was similar to the shape of other devices, such as MP3
players, phones, and cameras.
ii. Easy to Carry, Hold and Use: Preferences for one of
the low-fidelity prototypes over the other – typically the card-
shaped prototype over the cylindrical prototype – was also
dependent on the physical effort associated with carrying,
holding, and using it. This depended on: its Shape and Size,
and its Scrolling Method. The most common comment was that
the card-shaped prototype would fit well in a pocket, wallet,
or purse, making it easier to carry. It was also suggested that
it would be easier to hold and use because it was flat and had
minimal mechanical parts. Though some liked the scroll bar
on the cylindrical prototype, many were concerned about its
breakability and about the ease with which it could be used
relative to the buttons on the card-shaped prototype.
3) Trustworthiness: Users had high expectations of the (i)
Reliability and (ii) Security of Pico.
i. Reliability: Participants were concerned about scenarios
in which Pico would not work, meaning they would potentially
have no access to their accounts. One of the main concerns was
whether Pico would consistently work as intended – whether
there would be connection issues or whether Pico would have a
short battery lifetime. There were also concerns about physical
durability, centered on whether Pico would be waterproof and
could handle everyday physical strains.
ii. Security: Participants appeared to place particular em-
phasis on the security of Pico. Participants expressed concern
about who controlled the data, and whether their data could
be misused. Another source of anxiety, despite the proposed
system of Picosiblings for locking and unlocking Pico, was
impersonation of the user after loss or theft (see Section IV-B3
ii).
Participant responses suggest that introducing some form of
2FA could lessen anxiety. A minority of participants suggested
that the security risk could be minimized with biometrics, the
implication being that biometric authentication methods were
more secure. For example, Participant 6 asked:
“Don’t they say that there is going to be iris recog-
nition say for buying, to get your money out of the
bank? Why can’t you do that?”
B. Picosibling Preferences
Participants engaged in an analysis of the trade-off between
the perceived benefit of Picosiblings, and the inconvenience
of managing multiple items. Suggestions for minimizing the
inconvenience formed the following three core categories:
Hedonic Concerns, Utilitarian Concerns, and Routine Use.
1) Hedonic Concerns: Responses highlighted preferences
for control over Picosibling appearance. Such responses im-
plied that hedonic factors might increase the willingness of
some users to adopt Pico by making additional devices desir-
able in terms of the hedonic goals they might help users meet,
and thus less of an inconvenience. Suggestions for achieving
this fell into two subtly different categories: i. Self-Presentation
with wearable devices, and ii. Personalization, with devices
that can be changed by the user as they prefer.
i. Self-Presentation: It was important that Picosiblings fit in
with what participants already wore. Some suggested that they
should come in a range of designs. These could then add to a
user’s personal style and aid in their self-presentation; others
suggested simple and discrete devices that did not interfere
with personal style. For example, one participant said they
chose a necklace because there were times they might wear
a dress and have few places to keep Picosiblings. In this
example, the second function of the Picosibling was decorative.
ii. Personalization: The desire for personalization taps
into the desire for novelty, fun, and creativity, improving
user experience. It was suggested by one participant that
personalizable Picosiblings might make good gifts. In this way,
personalization could help users meet social goals, helping
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them express themselves by creating devices that fit in with
their personal style and with the personal styles of others.
2) Utilitarian Concerns: Suggestions for mitigating the
physical and cognitive effort associated with carrying Picosi-
blings in ways that met utilitarian needs fell into three cate-
gories: (i) whether Picosiblings could serve a Dual-Purpose
(additional results of use, aside from security), (ii) the Practi-
cal Convenience of carrying particular devices (the process of
use), and (iii) the Flexibility that these devices allow, referring
to how easy they would be to transfer between items and
replace when the user wants. The data reveal different levels of
convenience achieved with each type of Picosibling (Table II).
i. Dual-Purpose: It was important to most participants
that Picosiblings not only unlock their Pico, but help them
meet other goals. A common suggestion was for Picosiblings
embedded within other items, such as watches, credit cards,
or coins for trolleys – to serve a dual-purpose. However, if
such devices stopped working, were lost, or were forgotten, or
if the user simply did not want to use the device any longer,
these dual-purpose Picosiblings would not be as easy to replace
as “practically convenient” Picosiblings that attach to existing
items or more “flexible” Picosiblings that are designed to stick
or clip to items the user already owns, described below.
ii. Practical Convenience: The difference between this
sub-category and the “dual-purpose” sub-category is subtle:
practical convenience is determined by whether the user can
easily carry Picosiblings with items they already carry; they
need not be fully integrated into those items. Such items
would be more convenient by imposing less on the user’s
life. However, this tended to be limited to a few items that
people carry frequently, which included phone, wallet, and
keys, and depended on physical attributes such as size, shape,
and detectability.
iii. Flexibility: Participant responses suggested that it would
be important to allow potential users to move Picosiblings
between various items. The main benefit of this flexibility
would be allowing users more control over which items they
would like to use as Picosiblings as opposed to relying
on ready-made (dual-purpose) devices or finding (practically
convenient) places to keep non-embedded devices. This relies
on creating Picosiblings that are integratable and removable. A
recurring suggestion was to create Picosiblings that could be
easily stuck to and easily removed from belongings, an idea
caught in the following proposal from Participant 8:
“If you could make it small enough to be like a
sticker that you can put inside the back of your cover
of your mobile phone... or in cars and stuff”
Similar suggestions included: Picosiblings inserted into and
taken out of shoes, and a clip-in/clip-out scheme. However,
more flexible devices would perhaps be harder to keep track
of because their location could change frequently.
3) Routine Use: Participants stressed the presumed effort
associated with managing multiple devices. The majority of
Picosiblings were considered in terms of how they would be
routinely used (i) on a Day-to-Day basis, and (ii) in terms
of the Exceptions that could interrupt this. These exceptions
consistently focused on scenarios that related specifically to
preventing or recovering from loss and theft.
i. Day-to-Day: Participants expressed a preference for
Picosiblings that they would be able to have and rely on all
the time because they would be used daily, if not always. For
example, Participant 7 suggested:
“If I can wear something that is permanent. Like, for
me, the wedding ring is permanent”
The more permanent the device, the smaller the impact on
cognitive load, captured in the following comment from Par-
ticipant 17:
“And these [bracelets] would be a permanent fixture.
You know that you’ve got them at all times. You
wouldn’t have to worry about them”
The items that users tended to carry with them most
often were their keys, wallet, and phone. Thus, a recurring
suggestion was that Picosiblings either belonged to or could be
attached to at least one of these three items. Some Picosiblings
were also chosen because they could be used frequently, if not
everyday, such as during exercise (e.g. trainers or wristbands)
or at work (e.g. cufflinks or lab glasses).
Rather than relying solely on accessories and clothing,
some suggested that Picosiblings might be kept in more fixed
locations, such as on a work desk, at home, or in a car.
ii. Exceptions (Loss and Theft): Participants asked ques-
tions about loss and theft, and relatedly, forgetting Picosib-
lings; the main source of anxiety was with recovery.
Most expressed concern with the inconvenience of carrying
Picosiblings, or at least did not see how the security benefit
of such devices outweighed the cost. Many believed that this
system was insufficient for protecting against impersonation.
In particular, participants were concerned that a thief could
simply steal their Picosiblings, along with their Pico.
As well as particular items (notably, the magnetic clips), it
was suggested that particular situations were more conducive
to loss and theft. Participant 4, for example, commented:
“From working in a school, with teenagers espe-
cially, I can see that it would become a game for
that age group to, you know,... hide them and access
everyone’s account”
Participants typically wanted a minimal number of Picosi-
blings, and did not want to manage too many spares. Other
means of protecting the few Picosiblings participants would
be willing to carry were proposed instead. The most common
suggestion was for hidden or discrete Picosiblings. A less
common suggestion was to have weighted (by importance)
Picosiblings. For example, Participant 2 suggested:
“I don’t know if it’s worth, like, having a core one
that you have to have... But you could choose that
yourself so if, like, thieves got them, they wouldn’t
be like ‘ha! I got your main one’”
It was also suggested that user-defined hierarchies of
important accounts should be respected in the number of
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TABLE II. SOURCES OF CONVENIENCE FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF PICOSIBLINGS
Cognitive Effort Physical Effort Flexibility
Dual-Purpose (e.g. a
watch)
Reduced: User carries items they would carry
anyway.
Reduced: Devices are embedded within existing
items.
Limited by the number of dual-purpose items
the user has.
Practically Convenient
(e.g. a keyring)
Reduced: User carries devices that can be carried
with or attached to items they carry anyway.
Increased: Device is an additional item that the
user makes space for to carry.
Increased in terms of replaceability; limited in
the types of items that devices can be carried
with.
Flexible (e.g. a sticker
on a phone)
Increased: User must keep track of which items
have a sticker or clip attached.
Reduced: Devices are integrated with existing
items.
Increased in terms of replaceability, transferabil-
ity, and location.
Picosiblings required to unlock the Pico, captured in the
following comment from Participant 8:
“So, some stuff maybe doesn’t matter as much as
other stuff. So,... bank accounts, or important email
addresses or that kind of thing, you require more for.
In that case I wouldn’t mind having three separate
[Picosiblings]... because I’d probably be accessing
those from somewhere like home or from the office
where I can keep one”
These comments echo the thinking behind having a dif-
ferent password for different services based on the perceived
importance of these services. Believing that more devices
means more security appeared to lead to a more natural mental
model of this system, one where a hierarchy of accounts could
be unlocked by the addition of more Picosiblings, with zero
possibly being sufficient for some cases.
C. The Emerging Theory
Selective coding revealed an obvious core category (phe-
nomenon) underlying impressions of Pico – Inconvenience.
This was intimately related to the effort that participants
imagined they might have to expend on using and remembering
to carry a dedicated Pico device. As such, a popular suggestion
was to have Pico integrated with another device, such as a
watch, or for it to be a smartphone app. Similarly, some
participants implied that authentication devices should be kept
with other access-centered physical items already carried by
most people – credit/debit cards and keys. For example:
“I like the card kind of idea, kind of because you
can maybe put it [a card-shaped Pico] with other
secure... with your bank card” (Participant 9)
“I guess the [Pico]... has this kind of keyness to it
so it kind of makes sense [to keep Pico with your
keys]” (Participant 13)
More devices – Picosiblings – increased perceived incon-
venience because of the cognitive effort (keeping track of
Picosiblings) and the physical effort (carrying Picosiblings)
associated with managing them. For many, having additional
Picosiblings that were easy to attach to existing items, or
that had additional functions mitigated this trade-off. Also
important was the flexibility afforded to potential users in terms
of the transferability and replaceability of Picosiblings, though
this might be less convenient in terms of the cognitive effort
needed to keep track of them.
In considering the effort of managing physical devices,
participants expressed concerns about the reliability and se-
curity of Pico, and the loss, theft, or forgetting of Pico and
Picosiblings. Participants anticipated not only annoyance due
to inconvenience, but anxiety due to perceived risk. These ob-
servations form the basis of the second phenomenon identified
in selective coding: Risk Perception. To mitigate perceptions
of risk to security of Pico, some participants made suggestions
designed to provide additional reassurance. For example:
“Is there a way to do, like, a time thing on them? ... I
guess it just makes it even more secure ... because
it’s changing all the time” (Participant 2)
“[Fingerprint recognition] will probably be a phys-
ical connection to that device... And it will have a
green light or red light” (Participant 13)
These suggestions highlight a disconnect between user
mental models of the security of Pico and Pico’s actual
security. Similarly, with Picosiblings, the risk of losing or
forgetting Picosiblings evoked anxiety, even though the K out
of N scheme should mean that users would still have access
to their accounts, whilst disallowing access to others without
the required number of Picosiblings and the Pico device itself.
The issue, here, appears to be what the user is expected to do
to maintain the security of Pico, and if they are no longer in
possession of their Pico or some number of their Picosiblings.
In particular, the reluctance to accept Pico appears to lie
with concerns about taking on more personal Responsibility
for authentication and recovery – the third and final identified
phenomenon. Physical tokens are a more tangible means of au-
thentication than passwords. Their use involves more personal
responsibility because the user must actively take on more
inconvenient strategies to maintain security and availability
(e.g. due to losing or forgetting the token). The perception
that responsibility for secure authentication and recovery was
being shifted towards the user seemed to amplify participants’
focus on the imagined risks of Pico, affecting their anxiety
about security and reliability, and anticipated annoyance with
having to prevent or deal with interruptions. For example:
“The worry would be obviously if you lost one and
then you went to your access point and then realised
that you lost one: where would you always keep
the spares?... You wouldn’t want to carry too many
things” (Participant 17)
2FA schemes also increase personal responsibility, and so
it follows that participants who had experience of other token-
based schemes were more accepting of the idea of carrying a
dedicated Pico.
In the eyes of participants, the idea of Picosiblings seemed
to delegate yet another aspect of responsibility to the user:
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participants were concerned not only with how their accounts
were protected, but how their Picosiblings were protected from
loss and theft. The main suggested way of mitigating this
anxiety was to hide or disguise Picosiblings. For example:
“This would be, like, disguised as a key. So, maybe,
again this covert but then again also logical addition
to something I already own” (Participant 16)
The interplay between Inconvenience, Risk Perception,
and Responsibility is depicted in our final GT, in which we
describe the process of acceptance of more tangible security.
D. The Final Grounded Theory: Acceptance of More Tangible
Security
The problem of protecting more traditional forms of prop-
erty, such as wallets and keys, has long-established solutions
that people tend to understand better than protecting digital as-
sets. Given that users already cope with carrying and managing
physical items, one might expect users to be more accepting
of the idea of carrying physical devices for authentication.
However, our final GT suggests otherwise: although physical
keys have stood the test of time, token-based authentication
for computer systems seem to fall short of user requirements.
Much of the discomfort with a token-based scheme can be
traced back to participants’ mental models of risk and the in-
convenience associated with mitigating risk. This risk appears
greater when the user considers physical devices, which are
more tangible and thus considered “easier to steal”. After all,
loss and theft of tangible property is a longer existing problem
in human history than threats associated with much faster-
paced technology advances. Thus, protecting physical devices
is a more salient and intuitive problem than protecting digital
information (passwords). The storyline below, used to present
our final GT, describes how physical devices make users more
overtly responsible for their own secure authentication, and
creates an uncomfortable tension between a desire for day-to-
day convenience and for avoiding the risk of loss and theft.
We provide an illustration depicting this process (Figure 4).
The process of Token Scheme Acceptance depicted in Fig-
ure 4 positions the inconvenience of strategies for dealing with
a token-based scheme as a precursor for whether it is accepted.
This interacts with the user’s risk perception, also affecting
scheme acceptance. Potential users become more sensitive to
inconvenience and risk when the level of perceived personal
responsibility for authentication is high, as with managing
physical tokens. This is because physical tokens, which are
more tangible than knowledge-based secrets, literally put se-
curity in the hands of the user: with passwords, users passively
place trust in the service (say, an email provider) to reliably and
securely authenticate them; a token requires trust in a physical
device carried by the user to reliably and securely authenticate
them, making failure to login, or to keep authentication secure,
something that the user has to go out of their way to deal
with. This involves taking a much less convenient route than
the current means of recovery by resetting one’s password.
More devices (Picosiblings) translates into even greater
perceived likelihood of loss and theft. Even though a system
of Picosiblings might have dispelled concerns about losing the
Pico, it increased concerns about losing Picosiblings. These
scenarios were not only sources of interruptions (inconve-
nience), causing annoyance, but possible security breaches
(risk), causing anxiety.
This makes potential users of a token-based scheme, such
as Pico, uncomfortable because it represents a significant
behavior change that is not generally deemed worthwhile,
evidenced in comments about Pico having to sufficiently and
consistently improve lives before it would be accepted. This
calls for improvements in the way Pico can be managed, and
how we communicate Pico to potential users so that they are
able to form an appropriate mental model.
V. DISCUSSION
Our GT depicts token scheme acceptance as the result of
evaluations of inconvenience and risk, amplified by the locus
of responsibility for physical devices. We take the first steps
towards validating our GT by comparing its processes with
existing processes reported in the literature. This review of
related work was left to the end so we could be confident that
our final theory and model emerged from the data.
A. Related Research
Our data consistently revealed an emphasis on reducing
inconvenience, which was related to minimizing cognitive and
physical effort, identified in prior research [4]. Also in line with
other research, participants constructed their own Pico-related
threat models, just as users construct their own password-
related threat models [1]. In particular, they seemed to believe
that loss of any device represented a compromise to their
accounts. As such, Pico represented a significant and risky
behavior change for participants, even though, from a security
standpoint, a targeted attack with Pico is less likely than with
passwords because it cannot be conducted remotely. Theft is
even less likely to result in a security violation with Pico
because it would be harder to obtain the required K out of
N Picosiblings to carry out such an attack.
One observation made by Adams and Sasse [1] was that
users evaluate security threats and the importance of security
measures based on what they actually see, or in the case of
passwords, do not see. The issue here is tangibility, since
users rarely have direct experience of the consequences of a
security breach. We suggest that physical devices increase the
tangibility of security, encouraging users to take more personal
responsibility for a token rather than abdicating responsibility
to services that rely on passwords. This shifts the liability for
loss and theft to the user, increasing both anxiety about risk,
and anticipated annoyance associated with inconvenience.
In the field of human-computer interaction, models have
been developed for predicting technology adoption (e.g. Davis
et al. [8], Meuter et al. [22], Venkatesh et al. [29]). These
present several important antecedent predictors of initial tech-
nology use, including (but not limited to) inertia, technology
anxiety, experience, and novelty-seeking [22]. Our results are
in line with this: participants mostly accepted the current state
of authentication with passwords (inertia), expressed concern
about adopting Pico (anxiety), and were more willing to
adopt Pico if they were familiar with the concept of security
tokens (experience) or if they were motivated by the potential
enjoyment of choosing and modifying items (novelty-seeking).
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Fig. 4. The process involved in accepting a token-based authentication scheme (the central phenomenon) based on inconvenience, risk perception, and personal
responsibility (core categories).
Such models tend to focus on first-time technology use: a bad
first impression is hard to recover from and so emphasis is
placed on encouraging technology adoption. Our research, too,
considers initial reactions to the concept of Pico, and might be
applied in future research to other technology-adoption models.
For example, the Inconvenience and Risk Perception core cate-
gories in our final GT might be likened to: the “Efficiency” and
“Effectiveness” sub-constructs of usability defined by the ISO
9241-11 [17]; the “Ease-of-Use” and “Usefulness” precursors
to system use in the Technology Adoption Model (TAM) [9];
or the “Effort Expectancy” and “Performance Expectancy”
precursors of system use in the Unified Theory of Acceptance
and Usage of Technology (UTAUT) [3].
As well as technology acceptance research, our results are
consistent with findings relating specifically to physical tokens
(2FA and password managers). Similar to De Cristofaro et
al.’s [11] results, for example, users were more amenable
to the idea of using Pico for work or banking. We suggest
that this was because token-based authentication, like 2FA,
is more effortful, and deemed more worthwhile if required
by the context, or if the user already has experience of a
similar scheme. Our results are also consistent with Krol et
al. [21], whose participants worried about theft, and preferred
the idea of biometric authentication. Participants also disliked
the physical effort associated with having to interact with Pico.
This is in line with Krol et al. [21], whose participants disliked
the number of steps involved in using a token and wanted the
authentication process to be automated. It is also in line with
Weir et al. [30], who found that of three online banking tokens,
participants preferred the token that required the least amount
of physical effort (a push-button token), followed by a card-
activated token, and then the chip-and-PIN method.
B. Limitations
Our research is not without limitations, the most obvious
being a lack of ecological validity and a potential for acqui-
escence bias. Participants were aware we wanted to replace
passwords, and there was likely some motivation to give
“desirable” answers. It should be noted, however, that we were
careful to communicate, both verbally and in the informed
consent form, that we were looking for ways of improving
Pico, which was in an early design-stage; the aim was to
encourage honest opinions, even if negative. Indeed, even
with possible social pressure evoked by an interview setting,
participants were neither wholly complimentary about Pico,
nor wholly derogatory about passwords.
It is important to note that we do not make claims about
Pico’s long-term adoption. The focus of this paper is on
predicting the factors that might influence willingness to make
a behavior change (to use Pico instead of passwords), making
users co-producers in their own secure authentication. This
forms the basis of ideas about what we might be able to do,
in terms of future research, to improve this.
C. Future Research
This research is part of a larger iterative design process
of prototyping. Carrying out such research from an early
design stage provides valuable feedback that can be used to
form hypotheses about how users might find using Pico, to
create newer versions of prototypes, and to reduce the risk of
major changes becoming necessary later. For example, future
research could test the acceptability and reliability of biomet-
rics for unlocking Pico, and determine whether this really
does reduce user anxiety, before it is actually implemented
in working devices. Future research might also investigate
the possible disparity between what users say they would be
willing to carry and what they would actually carry.
In addition to changes to the Pico system, future research
should consider the role of service providers and the regu-
latory environment in incentivizing and protecting users. For
example, legislation or voluntary codes that prohibit service
providers from shifting liability to their users in the event of
a security incident may ameliorate anxieties about adopting
token-based authentication schemes.
Finally, the significant concern expressed by participants
about loss and theft suggests that more research on recovery
would be valuable. As well as the day-to-day experience, it
would be worth focusing on making the recovery procedure
easier so as to reduce the anticipated inconvenience of and
risk associated with loss or theft.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We presented the GT results of an interview-based study
looking at perceptions of Pico. Based on the final GT model,
we suggest that a token-based scheme, such as Pico, makes
authentication more tangible; this increases perceptions of per-
sonal responsibility for mitigating security risks and managing
physical items, which is potentially inconvenient and anxiety-
provoking for users. If this is the case, the challenge is in
minimizing the friction between security requirements and user
requirements, communicating the security benefits, and making
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sure these outweigh the anxiety costs. Specifically, although
putting responsibility for security in the hands of the user is
potentially good for protecting accounts and services, we face
three key challenges. First, we need to increase willingness to
take on more personal responsibility for security by reducing
annoyance and anxiety. Second, we want to avoid also putting
system failures (issues of reliability) in the hands of the user.
Third, we need to find a way of aligning potential users’
mental models of Pico with how it actually works to reduce
the likelihood that the scheme will be rejected before it is tried.
This research lays the groundwork for a new way of con-
sidering token acceptance. The long-term aim is to maximize
the usability of our scheme, but the key contribution of this
paper is in providing insight into the factors that may prevent
users from adopting a more tangible token-based scheme,
using Pico as an example. Specifically, it provides insight
into how people might perceive physicality when it comes to
authentication. Our final GT and the role of personal (versus
diffused) responsibility on token scheme acceptance is in need
of further exploration.
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